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AN INTERNATIONAL CODE TO PROTECT PRIVATE
INVESTMENT-PROPOSALS AND PERSPECTIVES*
A. A. FATOUROS"*
T HERE is general agreement among capital-exporting and capital-
importing countries as to the need for international investment in
the economically underdeveloped areas.' Increasing amounts of public and
private capital are today directed toward these areas,2 but the existing needs
are still far from being satisfied. The availability of public capital, in the
form of loans or grants, depends chiefly on considerations of a political
character.' The provision of private capital, on the other hand, depends on
a different set of conditions and considerations. Recent events in a number
of countries have brought into focus one particular aspect of the problem,
relating to the lack of security for private investments in underdeveloped
countries.
Foreign enterprises operating in underdeveloped countries are today
subject to a high degree of government control, direct or indirect.' The entry
*This article is based on material included in a doctoral dissertation submitted to the
School of Law of Columbia University. The author wishes to express his gratitude to
Professor Wolfgang Friedmann, Director of International Legal Research, Columbia
University, and Mr. Richard C. Pugh, of the New York Bar, for their invaluable help and
advice.
"*Lecturer in Law, University of Western Ontario.1Economic development being a relative concept, it is difficult to define it in absolute
terms. For our present purposes, it is enough to consider as underdeveloped those areas
which have a low annual per capita national income; they contain more than two-thirds
of the world's population. For some discussion on the criteria of economic development,
see N. S. Buchanan and H. S. Ellis, Approaches to Economic Development (New York,
1955), pp. 3-22; H. Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth (New
York, 1957), pp. 7-14; B. H. Higgins, Economic Development (New York, 1959),
pp. 3-24.2 Cf. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The International
Flow of Private Capital 1956-1958 (New York, 1959), and United Nations, Document
E/3369 (March 13, 1960). In addition to the amount of investment, its form and its
distribution among industries should also be taken into account. Private foreign investment
in underdeveloped countries is today chiefly direct in form (that is, involving a high
degree of control by the investor over the enterprise established in the capital-importing
country) and heavily concentrated in extractive and other primary producing industries.3Though economic and even moral considerations have to be taken into account in any
serious study of the topic; cf., for example, G. Myrdal, An International Economy (New
York, 1956), pp. 158 et seq. See also J. Viner, "Problems of Economic Policy: America's
Aims and the Progress of Underdeveloped Countries" in B. F. Hoselitz (ed.), The
Progress of Underdeveloped Areas (Chicago, 1952), p. 175; H. Stassen, "The Case for
Private Investment Abroad" (1954), 32 Foreign Affairs 402; G. Myrdal, Beyond the
Welfare State (New Haven, 1960), pp. 263 et seq.
4Of course, this is true of most developed countries as well, but it is with the under-
developed that we are dealing here. For some descriptions, see C. Lewis, The United
States and Foreign Investment Problems (Washington, D.C., 1948), pp. 141-67; M.
Brandon, "Legal Deterrents and Incentives to Private Foreign Investments" (1957), 43
Grotius Society Transactions 39; M. Brandon, "Legal Aspects of Private Foreign Invest-
ments" (1958), 18 Federal Bar Journal 298. And cf. United States Department of
Commerce Factors Limiting U.S. Investment Abroad, Part 1 (1953) and Part 2 (1954);
[Canadiani Advisory Committee on Overseas Investment, Report (1951).
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of foreign capital often depends upon the approval of the government of
the country of investment and the business activities of aliens or of foreign-
owned corporations are in many cases severely limited. The existence of
exchange controls makes the repatriation of the foreign investor's capital
or earnings difficult or, sometimes, impossible. And the possibility of expro-
priation, of the taking over of the whole enterprise by the government of
the host country, with inadequate or no compensation, is always present.
The businessmen of the capital-exporting countries are therefore reluctant
to invest in the underdeveloped areas, unless the expected profits are high
enough to compensate them for the risks they are taking.' The chief under-
lying cause of the insecurity of private investment is the general political
and economic instability which prevails in most underdeveloped countries
and is one of the causes as well as one of the effects of their underdevelop-
ment. No over-all solution, therefore, is possible, in the sole context of inter-
national investment. There is, however, room for partial improvement in
the underdeveloped countries' "investment climate"' and there exist several
types of measures which the governments of capital-exporting and capital-
importing countries may take in order to achieve such improvement.7
Capital-importing countries may pass special legislation granting a
minimum of legal protection and offering certain inducements to foreign in-
vestors.8 Capital-exporting states may offer to their nationals who invest
abroad insurance against some of the non-business risks which they
encounter in foreign countries.' It is also possible for capital-exporting states
to conclude bilateral treaties with capital-importing ones, providing for the
5Investment in the petroleum industry is a case in point. Such investment has con-
sistently accounted for about 50 per cent of the average annual increase in United States
direct foreign investment; cf. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, The
International Flow of Private Capital 1946-1952 (New York, 1954), pp. 12, 33; United
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The International Flow of Private
Capital 1956-1958, supra fn. 2, p. 27. The annual earnings of petroleum investment were
high; in 1951, they were over 24 per cent of book value, compared to 16 per cent in the
case of investment in manufacturing; cf. S. H. Axilrod, "Yield on U.S. Foreign Invest-
ment, 1920-1953" (1956), 38 Review of Economics and Statistics 331, 333.
6This term is generally used to refer to the combination of political, social, and cultural
conditions affecting foreign investment in any particular country, to the exclusion, as a
rule, of purely economic considerations; cf. M. Brandon, "Legal Deterrents and Incen-
tives to Private Foreign Investments" (1957), 43 Grotius Society Transactions 39, 41,
and passim; A. A. Fatouros, "Legal Security for International Investment" in W. G.
Friedmann and R. C. Pugh (eds.), Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment (Boston, 1959),
p. 699.7 For a general survey of such measures, see Fatouros, supra fn. 6.8 Cf. N. M. Baade, Gesetzgebung zur Frderung ausldndischer Kapitalanlagen (Frank-
furt, 1957); N. M. Littell, "Encouragement and Obstruction to Private Investment in
Foreign Investment Laws" (1958), 52 American Society of International Law Proceed-
ings 209. For a list of recent measures, see United Nations, Document E/3369 (May 13,
1960), Appendix.9 1nvestment guarantee programmes are now in effect in the United States, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and Japan. See United Nations, Document E/3325 (Feb. 26,
1960), pars. 179-86 and, on the American programme, see M. von Neumann Whitman,
The United States Investment Guaranty Program and Private Foreign Investment
(Princeton, 1959).
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protection of foreign investors."0 Finally, a single multilateral convention
might be concluded between capital-importing and capital-exporting coun-
tries which would assure full protection to the investments made by or in any
of its members.
Of the four methods just listed, the first three are today in use by a con-
siderable number of countries; the fourth is still in the proposal stage, despite
certain early attempts and the support of influential business circles. The
present article is an attempt to review and discuss the several related pro-
posals and to examine their probable effectiveness as well as the chances
for their realization.
The idea of a multilateral instrument calculated to provide protection
to foreign investors is relatively recent." A few uncertain and generally fruit-
less attempts in this direction were first made during the interwar period
by some League of Nations agencies. 2 Immediately after the Second World
War, increased consciousness of international economic problems along with
a widespread optimistic trend in favour of international organization led
to the formation of a movement for the general adoption of such a code.
This movement found support among scholars" as well as businessmen'4
and was favourably discussed by governments and international agencies,
but without any concrete result. After some years of comparative neglect,
the idea was recently revived with considerable force.
The chief official attempt at a general multilateral treaty embodying some
sort of code for foreign investment was the Charter of the International
Trade Organization (I.T.O.)," signed at Havana, Cuba, on March 24,
10 The main treaty programme of this type is that of the United States, on which see
R. R. Wilson, United States Commercial Treaties and International Law (New Orleans,
1960). The United Kingdom and West Germany have also concluded recently a few
similar treaties. Cf. United Nations, Document A/AC.97/5 (Dec. 15, 1959), chap. in,
pars. 1-48.
"IGustav Lippert's attempt to provide a code of International Financial Law is partly
related in scope but differs widely in its motives and objectives; cf. G. Lippert, Rechtsbuch
des internationalen Finanzrechtes (Graz, 1935).
12 See, for example, The Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners (1929),
League of Nations, Document C. 174. M. 53. 1928. 1i. 14, on which see J. W. Cutler,
"The Treatment of Foreigners in Relation to the Draft Convention and Conference of
1929" (1933), 27 American Journal of International Law 224. See also League of
Nations, Report of the Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts(Geneva, 1939) ; League of Nations, Special Joint Committee on Private Foreign Invest-
ment, Conditions of Private Foreign Investment (Princeton, 1946).
"3Cf. J. Viner, "Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter" (1947), 25
Foreign Affairs 612, 627; P. W. Bidwell and W. Diebold Jr., "The United States and
the International Trade Organization" (1949), International Conciliation, no. 449, pp.
184, 212.
14 Cf., for example, International Chamber of Commerce, Fair Treatment for Foreign
Investments: International Code (I.C.C. Brochure no. 129, 1949); National Foreign
Trade Council, Position of the National Trade Council with Respect to the Havana
Charter for an International Trade Organization (1950), pp. 53-4.
"5Cf. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related
Documents (1948), hereinafter cited as Havana Charter.
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1948, which never became effective. The Charter dealt in part with eco-
nomic development and, toward that end, laid down certain general rules
regarding the treatment and position of foreign investment in the signatory
states. 6 The relevant provisions had been included in the Charter at the
insistence of influential American business groups, but in their final formula-
tion they bore the imprint of the underdeveloped countries' viewpoint.
The Charter recognized the value of international investment, private as
well as public, and the need for allowing opportunities for private invest-
ments and for assuring their security. 7 Capital-importing countries under-
took in the Charter to avoid "unreasonable or unjustifiable action" injurious
to the foreign investors' interests, 8 to "provide reasonable security for
existing and future investments,' 9 to "give due regard to the desirability
of avoiding discrimination as between foreign investments,"2 and to enter
into consultation or negotiations with other governments with the object
of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to such matters.2 '
On the other hand, the Charter expressly recognized the right of capital-
receiving countries to interfere with foreign investments through screening,
restrictions on the ownership of enterprises, and any "other reasonable
requirements."
22
The Charter's provisions on international investment were inadequate.
Every positive statement was closely circumscribed by qualifications and
exceptions whose extent could not be determined with any precision. The
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties depended in major
part on the interpretation of such indefinite terms as "reasonable," "appro-
priate," or "unjustified." The right of capital-importing states to interfere
with private foreign investments was stated much more clearly than their
corresponding obligations of fair treatment.2 3 These provisions of the Charter
came under strong attack on the part of American business circles and this
was largely responsible for the Charter's ultimate non-ratification by the
United States and the other signatory states.2 ' The Organization of Trade
Co-operation which was set up later to replace the I.T.O. has a much more
16Ibid., c. ir, especially art. 12 on "International Investment for Economic Development
and Reconstruction." From among the numerous accounts and commentaries, see C.
Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (New York, 1949), pp. 145-8; Bidwell and Diebold,
supra note 13, pp. 208-12; G. Bronz, "The International Trade Organization Charter"
(1949), 62 Harvard Law Review 1089, 1110-12; J. E. S. Fawcett, "The Havana
Charter" (1951), 5 Yearbook of World Affairs 269, 272-3; R. N. Gardner, Sterling
Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford, 1956), pp. 365-6.
17Havana Charter, art. 12(1) (a) and (b). l8 Ibid., art. 11(1) (b).
19Ibid., art. 12(2) (a) (i). 2Olbid., art. 12(2) (a) (ii).
21Ibid., art. 12(2) (b). 22Ibid., art. 12(1) (c).2 3 Cf. Gardner, op. cit., at p. 366; Bidwell and Diebold, supra fn. 13, at p. 211.
2 4 See, in particular: National Foreign Trade Council, op. cit. supra fn. 14, at pp. 5-6,
53-60; National Association of Manufacturers, The Havana Charter for an International
Trade Organization (1949), pp. 3, 10-11; Committee for Economic Development, The
International Trade Organization and the Reconstruction of World Trade (1949),
pp. 30-2, 37-8. See also the excellent account of business opposition to the International
Trade Organization in W. Diebold Jr., The End of the ITO (Princeton, 1952), pp.
11-24.
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limited jurisdiction and function. In the agreement instituting it,2" there
are no provisions relating to economic development, international invest-
ment, and like matters.26
Another multilateral international instrument dealing in part with the
protection of private international investment is the Economic Agreement
of Bogota, signed at the Ninth International Conference of American States,
on May 2, 1948.7 The relevant provisions, which constitute chapter Iv
of the Agreement (articles 22-7), are rather similar to those in the I.T.O.
Charter, though more elaborate and positive. The importance of foreign
investment is again emphasized and a general guarantee of "equitable treat-
ment," especially non-discrimination, is given. The desirability of employ-
ing foreign skilled personnel is recognized, the signatory states undertaking
not to hinder unduly such employment. 29 They also undertake to lighten the
tax burden when excessive," ° and to "impose no unjustifiable restrictions" on
the transfer of earnings and capital outside the capital-receiving state.31
Expropriation of property, when effected in accordance with local legislation
and when non-discriminatory, is authorized; it is unequivocally stated,
however, that "any expropriation shall be accompanied by payment of fair
compensation in a prompt, adequate and effective manner. ' 3 2 These pro-
visions lose much of their importance through the constant use of indefinite
terms such as "appropriate," "unjustifiable," "just," or "equitable." Further-
more, several states attached at the time of signature express reservations
on the scope and effects of the relevant articles, especially the article dealing
with expropriation. The Bogota Agreement, like the I.T.O. Charter, has
never become legally effective.38
Since that time, no other multilateral conventions dealing with the
protection of international investment have been concluded. The subject
2 5The text is in (1953) 32 United States Department of State Bulletin 579; cf. G.
Bronz, "An International Trade Organization: The Second Attempt" (1956), 69 Harvard
Law Review 440.2 6The proponents of American participation in O.T.C. have laid particular emphasis
on this point; cf. United States Congress, Hearings before the House Committee on Ways
and Means (1956), 84th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 7-8, 41 (statement of Secretary of State
Dulles), pp. 397, 407-8 (statement of Mr. S. Rubin), p. 791 (statement of Professor
R. Blough).2 7 Economic Agreement of Bogota (1948), Pan American Union, Law and Treaty
Series, no. 25 (hereinafter cited as Bogota Agreement).2 SIbid., art. 22.
29Ibid., art. 23(3). 30Ibid., art. 27.
31Ibid., art. 22(4). 321bid., art. 25.3 3 Several years later, the Economic Conference of the Organization of American States
approved the Economic Declaration of Buenos Aires, of September 2, 1957, in which it
was stated that the governments of American states should take measures to promote
international trade and investment and should intensify their efforts "to expand the flow
of public capital to the countries of the American continent . . . and- to encourage private
investment therein"; cf. (1957) 37 United States Department of State Bulletin 540, 541.
There was no mention of the need for measures for the protection of foreign investment.
An "Act of Bogota" dealing with measures for social improvement and economic
development was adopted on September 13, 1960, by a Special Committee of the Council
of the Organization of American States; cf. (1960) 43 United States Department of
State Bulletin 537. Private foreign investment is mentioned in it only once, in connection
with the need for long-term loans on flexible terms.
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has been brought up within some international bodies, but the related
discussions were either inconclusive, or resulted in general recommendations
on state policies leading to the improvement of the investment climate in
underdeveloped countries.
In 1947, the Economic and Employment Commission of the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations instructed its Sub-Commission
on Economic Development "To commence a study ... with the view to
making recommendations regarding the need for an international code re-
lating to foreign investment which will cover among other things the protec-
tion of economic and social interests of the countries in which investments
are to be made, as well as the protection of investors, both public and
private. . . ."" The topic was discussed in the Council's next session" and
it was mentioned occasionally in the meetings of the Commission and
Sub-Commission during the next few months. 6 It was altogether dropped
after the signature of the I.T.O. Charter.
A few years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted in its
1954 session a resolution concerning the encouragement of foreign private
investment."7 The Assembly recognized the useful role of private foreign
investment in the development of underdeveloped countries and, noting
its present shortage, made various recommendations to capital-importing
and capital-exporting states. To the former, it recommended, inter alia,
the avoidance of discrimination and the facilitation of the importation of
capital goods and of the transfer abroad of the investors' earnings."8 It also
recommended to both categories of states the conclusion of agreements for
the encouragement of private foreign enterprise.
3 9
The question was again raised in a speech of the Prime Minister of the
Federation of Malaya before the fourteenth session of the Economic Com-
mission for Africa and the Far East.4" The investment charter he suggested
34 United Nations, Document E/255 (Feb. 5, 1947), pp. 12-13.3 5 Cf. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records (2nd year, 4th
sess., 56th to 59th meetings, March 6-7, 1947), pp. 33-4, 41, 46, 49-50, 54, 55-6.3 6 Cf. the following United Nations documents: E/CN. 1/47 (Dec. 18, 1947), at pp. 9,
20-1; E/CN. 1/61 (July 1, 1948), at p. 20; E/CN. l/Sub. 3/4 (Nov. 14, 1947), passim.3 7 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 824 (ix) (Dec. 11, 1954), 1954 Year-
book of the United Nations 135.3 8 Note, however, that, around the same time, certain discussions on the principle of
self-determination of states resulted in the adoption of resolutions and other texts stressing
the absolute character of the "right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural
wealth and resources." Cf. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 626 (vii)
(Dec. 21, 1952). That this emphasis was chiefly directed against the "exploitation" by
foreign investors is brought out forcefully in J. N. Hyde, "Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Wealth and Resources" (1956), 50 American Journal of International Law 854.3 9 Similar resolutions were taken by the Tenth International Conference of American
States, 1954 (Resolutions Lxx and LXXI) and by the Contracting Parties to the General
Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (Resolution of March 4, 1955).4 0 Cf. the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Official
Records, 14th sess. (March, 1958), United Nations, Document E/CN. 11/483 (June 3,
1958), p. 29. And see A. Larson, "Recipients' Rights under an International Investment
Code" (1960), 9 Journal of Public Law 172, 172-3.
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would provide for the equitable treatment of foreign investors and for the
protection of their legal rights while at the same time assuring the respect
for the sovereignty and national interest of the capital-importing country.
The matter came before the United Nations General Assembly and its
Second Committee in their 1958 session. The resolution finally adopted,
however, while stressing the need for improvement of the underdeveloped
countries' investment climate, did not refer directly to the possible formula-
tion of an investment code. 4 It only requested the Secretary-General to
consult "qualified persons" concerning the fields of activity where foreign
private investment "is needed and sought by underdeveloped countries,"
its appropriate form and volume, and the type of projects in which foreign
investors might be interested.
The Secretary-General's report, submitted early in 1960,42 followed
closely the lines laid down by the resolution. It reviewed the fields of invest-
ment in underdeveloped countries and the government policies affecting
them and then went on to examine the various forms of investment. It
dealt in detail with incentive measures taken by capital-importing as well as
capital-exporting countries, such as the provision of basic facilities and of
development capital and the national and international measures relating
to taxation and exchange control. In dealing with measures for the protec-
tion of private foreign investment, the report examines briefly the particular
forms which they may take. It is in this connection that the question of an
international investment code is discussed. A survey of some of the related
proposals is followed by a brief commentary which stresses the difficulties
and dangers inherent in the attempt to formulate such a code. The report
as a whole is highly informative, but it can by no means be considered
as promoting the cause of an international investment code.
Of greater importance, though as yet of dubious effectiveness, are the
discussions within the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. A
1957 report of a study group, dealing with the problems of the co-operation
between European and African states for the latter's economic develop-
ment, mentioned the possibility of preparing an Investment Statute "defining
the rights and duties of investors and borrowers" and providing for certain
other matters.4 3 The idea was adopted by the Assembly's Economic Com-
mittee44 and by the Consultative Assembly itself, which recommended to
the Committee of Ministers the convocation of a conference of European
4 1United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1318 (xm) (Dec. 12, 1958), 1958
Yearbook of the United Nations 145.4 2
"The Promotion of the International Flow of Private Capital," Progress Report by
the Secretary-General, United Nations, Document E/3325 (Feb. 26, 1960).
43Report of the Study Group for the Development of Africa, Consultative Assembly
Document 701 (Sept. 26, 1957). For an analysis, see A. Gaitskell, "Europe and the
Economic Development of Africa" (1959), 6 European Yearbook 1958 29, 44-9.4 4 Draft Recommendation (with Explanatory Memorandum) Submitted by the Eco-
nomic Committee, Consultative Assembly Document 798 (April 1, 1958).
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and African states to deal with these questions.4 5 The Committee of Minis-
ters having deferred its action, the Assembly instructed its Economic Com-
mittee to present detailed proposals.46 The resulting report 7 did not contain
a draft text but dealt in some detail with the problems and possible content
of an investment code. In its subsequent recommendations, 8 the Assembly
admits the possibility that an Investment Statute might not be adopted
within a short time. Considering the subject as one eminently suitable for
joint European-African discussion, it insists on the convocation of a confer-
ence49 and requests the governments of the Council of Europe's member
states to prepare drafts for the proposed statute, on the lines set out in the
aforementioned report.
According to this report, the proposed Investment Statute should assume
the form of an international convention among a "large enough number" of
European and African states. It should lay down general rules, leaving
detailed provisions to be worked out in the specific contracts between states
and private investors. It should provide for the rights and duties of capital-
importing states as well as foreign investors. Its preamble would consist
chiefly of a basic statement of principles, including an affirmation of the
state's extensive rights with respect to the admission and regulation of
foreign investment, a statement on the investors' duties toward the host state,50
and a stipulation on the part of the contracting states to treat foreign inves-
tors equitably, protect them from the effects of future state action, and carry
out in good faith their obligations under the convention. The Statute in
question would apply to future long-term investments, direct as well as port-
folio.5 It would provide for non-discrimination toward foreign investors,
for national treatment with respect to taxation and to civil and legal rights,
for freedom of transfer of the foreign investors' earnings,5 2 and for due
process and fair compensation in the case of any expropriation of property.
An annexed protocol would provide for compulsory arbitration in case
of dispute; not only the contracting states, but also the nationals concerned,
45 Consultative Assembly Recommendation 159 (1958) on the Development of Africa.
The Committee of Ministers, composed of the foreign ministers of the member states, is
the Council of Europe's chief executive organ, in effect the only one with the power to
decide and act. The Assembly's competence, as indicated by its name, is of a purely
advisory character. Cf. A. H. Robertson, European Institutions (London, 1959), pp. 61
et seq.4 6 Consultative Assembly Order 124 (Oct. 10, 1958).4 7Report on an Investment Statute and a Guarantee Fund against Political Risks,
Consultative Assembly Document 1027 (Sept. 8, 1959).4 8 Consultative Assembly Recommendation 211 (1959) on the Development of Africa.4 9 See also the subsequent Consultative Assembly Recommendation 223 (1960) on
the same subject, where the Assembly's point of view is restated in answer to reservations
of the Committee of Ministers with respect to the proposed conference.50 1t would be made clear that foreign investors have the obligation "to respect national
laws and customs, abstain from political interference, integrate activities in the domestic
economy, collaborate with nationals of the country concerned and co-operate in the
technical field." Consultative Assembly Document 1027, supra fn. 47, at p. 11.
51With respect to past investments, equitable treatment would be provided and,
perhaps, freedom of transfer of earnings and fair compensation in case of dispossession.
Ibid., pp. 12-13. 521bid., pp. 17-18.
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would be able to take advantage of the arbitration procedure. Special
emphasis is placed, throughout the report, on the duty of the capital-import-
ing state not to alter its own system of regulations affecting foreign invest-
ments when such investments have been undertaken because of the system's
existence.5" The report's realistic approach is evident in the proposed pro-
visions for compensation (instead of restitution) in cases of infringement
of the convention and for ad hoc consultation of the contracting states with
respect to each eventual case where the imposition of sanctions is deemed
necessary.
The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.)
has also been studying in recent years the problems involved in the proposals
for an international investment code. Two draft conventions were submitted
to it in 1958, one by the German government and the other by the Swiss
government, and they have been under consideration by the Organization's
Committee for Invisible Transactions. The two proposals differ in some
important respects and they can be said to complement each other. Neither
of them, however, deals with the obligations of foreign investors toward the
states of investment. The German proposal is the latest reformulation of a
privately proposed draft convention, which will be discussed at a later
point.54 The Swiss proposal is a draft international convention concerning
guarantees for the investment of foreign capital. It is relatively brief, con-
sisting of seven articles, and it places special emphasis on the elimination of
exchange restrictions. It provides for free transfer of all earnings as well
as of amortization payments and of the original capital invested. Require-
ments with respect to expropriation are limited to the payment of adequate
compensation, which the investor would be allowed to repatriate freely.
Provisions regarding the establishment of an arbitration tribunal, compe-
tent to deal with any disputes arising out of the application or interpretation
of the convention, are also included.
Rather more important, though still of a doubtful practical significance up
to now, are the proposals of influential private groups, representative of the
prospective investors' viewpoints. In 1949, the International Chamber of
Commerce published a draft International Code of Fair Treatment for
Foreign Investors, to be eventually embodied in a multilateral international
instrument.55 The code strongly condemns discrimination against foreign
53This duty would be mentioned both in the preamble and in the main body of the
convention. In the preamble, the contracting states would undertake "to afford future
investments reasonable protection against worsening of the conditions prevailing at the
time the investment is made, when those conditions are laid down by the law and
administrative or other regulations and when the deteriorating situation is such as to
jeopardize the investment," Ibid., p. 11, and see also p. 16.
54 Cf. infra, pp. 86-8.55 1nternational Chamber of Commerce, Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments:
International Code (I.C.C. Brochure 129, 1949), hereinafter cited as I.C.C. Code.
The code was based on the proposals of the Committee on the Flow of Capital of the
United States Associates of the International Chamber of Commerce; cf. its Report
(1946). For commentaries, see B. A. Wortley, "Examination of Draft of International
Chamber of Commerce Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign Investments" (1952).
86 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
investors and prohibits all restrictions on the ownership and personnel
of private enterprises, allowing an exception only in the case of "enterprises
directly concerned with national defense." 56 Foreign investors are to be
granted full freedom in the transfer of their profits, capital, and any other
related funds outside the capital-importing state57 and they are to be fully
compensated in the event of their property's expropriation.5" The code
also contains provisions on the adjudication of disputes arising over its appli-
cation before a proposed international court of arbitration. 9 Though first
proposed more than ten years ago and repeatedly mentioned by successive
I.C.C. congresses since then,6" the Code of Fair Treatment has received
no official support or recognition as yet.
The recent revival of interest in investment codes is due in major part
to the activities of a single private group, namely, the German Society to
Advance the Protection of Foreign Investments, to whose initiative should
be attributed several of the recent drafts and proposals.6 ' In December,
1958, a private group of an international character was set up, the Inter-
national Association for the Promotion and Protection of Private Foreign
Investment (A.P.P.I.), composed of a number of well-known European
lawyers and representatives of "a considerable number of industrial, banking
and other concerns having international relations and interests in the
development of foreign trade and investment."6 This association seems
to have supplanted the German Society, on the international scene.
The German Society's first major move was its proposal for the adoption
of a "magna charta" of foreign investment, made at the International
Industrial Development Conference held in San Francisco in 1957. 63 The
proposal had a favourable reception in business circles and received consider-
able publicity. 4 Although the original text of a draft convention, as pro-
posed in 1957,6" has been amended on many important points subsequently,
International Bar Association, Third International Conference of the Legal Profession
241; V. Folsom, "The Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investors" in American
Society of International Law, 1958 Investment Law Conference (mimeo.).
56I.C.C. Code, arts 3-7. 57Ibid., arts. 9, 10, and 11(c) and (d). Cf. infra p. 92.
5SIbid., art. 11. Cf. infra pp. 93-4. 59Ibid., arts. 13 and 14. Cf. infra p. 96.
60Cf. the resolutions of the 16th Congress of the International Chamber of Com-
merce, March, 1954 (I.C.C. Brochure 193, 1954).6 1Compare fns. 65, 76, and 89 infra.6 2 M. Brandon. "Recent Measures to Improve the International Investment Climate"
(1960), 9 Journal of Public Law 125. Mr. Brandon is Geneva Secretary of A.P.P.I.
63See H. J. Abs, "The Safety of Capital" in Private Investment: The Key to Inter-
national Industrial Development (1958), pp. 69, 76-7. See also H. J. Abs, "The Protec-
tion of Duly Acquired Rights in International Dealings as a European Duty" in Society
to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investment, Foundation and Purposes (1956),
p. 51.6 4 0n the proposal's extensive press coverage, see A. S. Miller, "Protection of Private
Foreign Investment by Multilateral Convention" (1959), 53 American Journal of
International Law 371, 375, fn. 25.65 Society to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investment, International Convention
for the Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries (with Intro-
duction and Comments in English translation, Cologne, 1957), hereinafter cited as
1957 Draft Convention. For a summary and comments, see Miller, supra fn. 64.
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it is still worthy of further study, as a clear and able statement of the views of
at least a considerable number of prospective foreign investors.
The Draft Convention's chief objective is to provide to foreign investors
the most extensive protection possible. Aliens are guaranteed "national treat-
ment" and freedom from any restriction on the acquisition and utilization
of property rights with the exception of activities in a few specified fields."0
The convention limits very strictly the capital-importing state's right to
expropriate the aliens' holdings and describes with precision the form and
extent of the compensation to be awarded.
6 7
Two of the convention's provisions are of special interest at this point.
Not only the states parties to the convention but their nationals as well are
to be directly entitled to the rights thereunder. The convention's stipulations
are to be directly binding on the courts and other government instru-
mentalities of the party states and they will prevail over national legislation
in these states.68 The investors therefore do not depend on their state's
espousal of their claims in order to enforce their rights. The draft convention
gives also a list of possible sanctions against states violating its provisions69
and provides for the creation of an international court of claims.70 The
second interesting novelty is a provision stating that the states party to the
convention "undertake to apply the stipulations of the Convention mutatis
mutandis in the case of unlawful measures adopted against the property,
rights and interests of nationals of the High Contracting Parties by States
which are not parties to the Convention."7 ' This provision may in all
fairness be understood as proposing the formation of a coalition of capital-
exporting states with the object of keeping in line the capital-importing
states.
Early in 1958, a group of European jurists, under the chairmanship of
Lord Shawcross, prepared another draft convention, 72 said to be based on
the provisions of the United States F.C.N. treaties. 7 The draft convention
provided for the equitable treatment of aliens, the obligation of states to
respect their undertakings toward aliens, and the strict limitations imposed
on the states' right to expropriate foreign property. 74 It also included pro-
visions on the adjudication of any related disputes. 75
661957 Draft Convention, arts. iv and v. The fields mentioned are public utilities,
public transport, utilization of nuclear energy, and production of war material.
67Ibid., arts. vi and vii. Cf. infra pp. 94-5.
68Ibid., art. ix. 69Ibid., art. xi(5) (3) and appendix.
7OIbid., arts. x and xi. Cf. infra p. 97. 71Ibid., art. xii.
7 2For a detailed summary, see M. Brandon, "An International Investment Code:
Current Plans," 1959 Journal of Business Law 7, 12-15.7 3See supra fn. 10. Note, however, that the corresponding provisions in the United
States treaties are far more restricted in applicability: cf. the relevant comments on a
later draft by S. D. Metzger, "Multilateral Conventions for the Protection of Private
Foreign Investment" (1960), 9 Journal of Public Law 133, 139-43.
74Cf. infra p. 95.7 5 Disputes were to be submitted to the International Court of Justice. It was also pro-
vided that a state would be entitled to take measures to give effect to that Court's judg-
ment, if the other state failed to comply with it; Brandon, supra fn. 72, at pp. 14, 15.
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The above draft convention and the one proposed by the German Society
to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investment were ultimately combined
in a new draft which, after repeated amendments, reached in May, 1959, its
present form.76 This draft is now under consideration by the Organization
for European Economic Co-operation 7 7 and has been extensively discussed
among jurists. 7' The proposed convention would provide for the equitable
treatment of the property of aliens79 and for the obligation of states to
observe strictly "any undertakings which [they] may have given in relation
to investments made by nationals of any other Party."8 " Expropriation of
foreign property is to be allowed only under certain conditions.8" Disputes
relating to the convention are to be submitted to an arbitration tribunal, 2
to which nationals of the states party to it may also have access.83 The
draft convention provides for measures to be taken by states, individually
or collectively, in cases of breach of the convention 4 or of non-compliance
with the tribunal's award. 5 It is to be noted that the 1957 Draft Conven-
tion's provision on measures to be taken against states not party to the con-
vention 6 has been dropped. The new draft's authors, however, seem still
to favour the initial adoption of the convention by a limited number of
(chiefly capital-exporting) states, probably those of Western Europe.8 7
This last point of view is expressed openly in a slightly earlier study by
another European group, the European League for Economic Co-opera-
tion, 8 prepared on the initiative of the group's German National Commit-
7 6 The text of this draft, hereinafter cited as 1959 Draft Convention, with a comment
by its authors is printed in (1960) 9 Journal of Public Law 116.
77Cf. supra, p. 85.
78Cf. especially, H. Shawcross, "The Promotion of International Investment" (1960),
8 NATO Letter, no. 2, p. 19; Metzger, supra fn. 73; G. Schwarzenberger, "The Abs-
Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A Critical Commentary" (1960),
9 Journal of Public Law 147.
791959 Draft Convention, art. i.
8OIbid., art. n. This provision is meant to cover the cases of contractual commitments
of states to aliens; cf. Comment by the draft convention's authors (1960), 9 Journal of
Public Law 119, 120-1.
811959 Draft Convention, art. m.
82Ibid., art. vn(1). Detailed provisions are included in an annex attached to the
convention.
831bid., art. vii(2). Such access will depend on an optional declaration to be made by
any state party.
841bid., art. iv. The parties to the convention undertake not to "recognize or
enforce within their territories any measures conflicting with the principles of this
Convention. . ."
85Ibid., art. viii. States "shall be entitled . . . to take such measures as are strictly
required to give effect to" the award. Note the absence of a binding obligation.8 6 Cf. supra fn. 71.
8 7 The draft convention's submission to the O.E.E.C. is indicative of such a point
of view; cf. also Sfiawcross, supra fn. 78, at p. 22. It is needless to stress the fact that
Western European states are economically developed and that most of them are capital-
exporting.
88 European League for Economic Co-operation, Common Protection for Private
Internationai Investments (1958). The E.L.E.C. is one of the private groups associated
with the European Movement and seems to represent the views of industrial and banking
circles.
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tee. 9 Without presenting any draft text, this study goes further than any
other proposal in upholding measures intended to "protect" foreign investors
to the utmost extent. Its central proposal is the formulation and implemen-
tation by the six European Common Market countries of a common policy
with respect to private foreign investments. It is suggested that a "Solidarity
Convention" should be concluded among these countries, binding them to
concerted action with respect to foreign investments. This proposal might
be construed as an effort to achieve European unity in an additional field
of economic policy, were it not for the study's emphasis on the extension of
the convention "as soon as possible to include all the great net capital-
exporting countries and even, if feasible, the great international financial
organizations" (for example, the World Bank and the I.F.C.). ° It is
frankly stated that this convention "should first and foremost be an instru-
ment of pressure for inducing third countries" to accept a Charter of
Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments. 9 Such a charter would provide
for the national treatment of foreign investors, full indemnification in case
of expropriation,9" freedom of transfer for earnings and part of capital,
virtual exemption from any requirements for the employment of local
nationals,93 and a high degree of respect for existing concessions.94 Provision
for an arbitration procedure to be followed in cases of disputes is to be made
by a special protocol annexed to the charter.95
The report is remarkable for the detailed exposition of possible methods
to be used in assuring the charter's implementation. The states party to
the Solidarity Convention will undertake to act in concert against any
state not acting in accordance with the convention, whether or not itself
a party to the convention or the charter.96 The measures to be taken may be
official, such as the refusal to accord loans to the state at fault or to give
commercial or investment guarantees to new investments in that state.97
89 The original suggestions came from Dr. Hermann Abs, a director of the Deutsche
Bank, chairman of the European League's German Committee, and president of the
Society to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investment.
90E.L.E.C., op. cit. supra fn. 88, at p. 17, and cf. ibid., at p. 27.
91Ibid., at p. 17.
921bid., at p. 19; and cf. infra p. 94.
93 The business concerns involved "would never be refused permission to import (at
least temporarily) the technicians they required." Ibid. But see also infra fn. 101.94 The state of investment should not make any change in the act of concession
or in the state regulations under which a foreign enterprise is operating (for example,
with respect to wage or price determination) "without authorising corresponding altera-
tions in the schedule of charges for the products or services provided by the concern, so
that its profit-making capacity would not be compromised." Ibid., p. 19.
951bid., pp. 16, 20, 25-6.9 6It is even assumed in the study that in most cases the state "at fault" will not be a
party to these instruments. Note, for example, the language used in this connection: the
members of the Solidarity Convention will undertake to take measures against "any
country which is at fault, even if that country is itself a signatory of the Solidarity
Convention." Ibid., p. 16.
97Ibid., p. 25. These measures are to be taken in the case of non-execution of an
arbitral award; it is not clear whether they could be taken in the case of a refusal to
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But measures may be taken by private persons as well, namely, foreign
investors who would be induced to conclude contracts with their govern-
ments "not to invest in a country black-listed for interfering with foreign
capital after the entry in force of the Solidarity Convention.""8 The ways in
which investors may be induced to enter into such contracts are also exam-
ined. They may consist in the offering of protection under the convention or
in persuading banks "to sign a gentlemen's agreement whereby they would
make it more difficult to obtain credit for operations based on an investment
made in violation of the rules it is hoped to lay down."
99
The European League's study favours the conclusion of special agreements
between foreign investors and the government of the country of investment,
if only in order to make evident any future violation of certain standard
provisions which would be included in such agreements. 1' It also admits,
with certain qualifications, the desirability of associating local interests with
the investment, through their participation in ownership or management.
The investor's obligations to respect the local laws and to contribute to the
development of the host country are also mentioned, though placed on a
moral rather than a legal basis.''
A few other private groups have also been considering the problem of
an international investment code. In the United Kingdom, a group of
members of Parliament prepared a detailed report on the matter.'0 2 The
report favours the conclusion of an international convention which would
lay down certain "objectives and procedures," without providing a strict
"Code of rules.' 1 °3 Particular emphasis is laid on the necessity of a wide
membership and the participation of underdeveloped countries. In fact,
the report envisages the creation of a special international agency, possibly
connected with one of the international organizations now in existence.'
0
'
The report stresses the need for including in any international convention
of this sort provisions concerning the rights, as well as the duties, of capital-
importing countries. 5 The foreign investors' views are not accepted in their
submit to arbitration. It is, however, expressly stated that collective action of some sort,
on the part of the states signatory to the Solidarity Convention, will be taken against
any country violating the principles of the charter, "whether that country has adhered to
the Charter or not." Ibid., p. 16.
98Ibid., pp. 22-3. In cases of special need, the government of the capital-exporting
state might grant to individual investors exemption from this prohibition.99 Ibid. p.23, and cf. ibid., p. 25.
lOObid., p. 22. The study also suggests, however, that the investor may undertake not
to repatriate his investment for a specified number of years. Ibid., p. 23.
10 'Ibid., pp. 13-14.
'°
2 Parliamentary Group for World Government. A World Investment Convention?
Report of an All-Party Commission on a World Investment Code (1959). No draft
text is proposed in this report.
lO8Ibid., pp. 14-15.
104The World Bank is considered as the most appropriate of the United Nations
agencies in this connection: ibid., p. 16.
lO5Ibid., pp. 6, 17-19. The agency's permanent seat would be in one of the under-
developed areas. The governing body may include representatives not only of govern-
ments but also of public and private interests.
INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT 91
entirety. Thus, the report disapproves of requirements for majority participa-
tion of nationals in the ownership of enterprises, 0 6 but it strongly favours
requirements for minority participation.' Exchange restrictions or require-
ments for the employment of local nationals are treated in the same vein.
The possibility of the conclusion of special agreements between foreign in-
vestors and the governments of capital-importing states is generally favoured.
It is stated in this connection that such agreements should be respected
or "fair compensation should be paid if they are revoked."'0 ° The report
further provides for the establishment of an arbitration tribunal, but it does
not favour the provision of sanctions to be applied in the case of non-
compliance with the award." 9 Though undoubtedly too brief and therefore
lacking in precision with respect to concrete arrangements, the report in
question constitutes one of the few balanced and unbiased contributions in
this field.
A number of international private groups have expressed in general terms
their support of the adoption of an international investment code, stating,
on occasion, certain general principles whose inclusion in the code they
favour. Such support is expressed in a resolution proposed at the 1958
Conference of the International Bar Association, 10 a resolution adopted
by the 1958 Conference of the Inter-Parliamenary Union,"' and the first
resolution of the International Association for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Private Foreign Investments." 2 The idea has also found support in
the statements of several jurists, both in Europe and in the United States. 13
The reports and studies on the international law of state responsibility by the
Harvard Law School" 4 and by the International Law Commission" 5 should
also be mentioned here, for they are relevant, even though they are not
directly related to the question of an investment code of the type here
discussed.
106Cf. ibid., pp. 10-12, 15.
lO7Ibid., p. 13.
08lbid., p. 12. ' 09 Cf. ibid., pp. 18-20.
'
t
°International Bar Association, Seventh Conference Report (1958), p. 484.
"As reported by M. Brandon, "An International Investment Code: Current Plans,"
1959 Journal of Business Law 7, 16-17.
112Cf. M. Brandon, "Recent Measures to Improve the International Investment
Climate" (1960), 9 Journal of Public Law 125, 126.
"l3Cf., for example, Mr. C. S. Rhyne's address, cited by Brandon, supra fn. 111, at
p. 15; Mr. L. Hjerner's remarks at the I.L.A. conference, in International Law Associa-
tion, Report of the Forty-eighth Conference (1958), pp. 167-70; 0. W. Haight, "Activi-
ties of the International Chamber of Commerce and Other Business Groups" (1960),
54 American Society of International Law Proceedings 200, 203-5.
114Cf. the excerpts from the latest draft of the Draft Convention on International
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, reported and discussed in (1960) 54
American Society of International Law Proceedings 102 et seq.
115Cf. the successive reports of the Commission's Special Rapporteur, Dr. Garcia-Ama-
dor, in 1956-11 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 173, 1957-I Year-
book of the International Law Commission 104, and 1958-II Yearbook of the Inter-
national Law Commission 47, and the related discussions among the members of the
Commission, in 1956-I Yearbook of the International Law Commission 228 and 1957-I
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 154.
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II
Before attempting a general evaluation of the proposals for a code of
international investment, it would be useful to discuss and compare in
some detail the provisions of the proposed codes with respect to certain im-
portant topics, namely, the questions of exchange control, expropriation of
foreign-owned property, and the settlement of disputes.
With respect to exchange restrictions, the Economic Agreement of Bogota
in 1948 provided for the obligation of the signatory states to "impose no
unjustifiable restrictions upon the transfer of [foreign] capital and the
earnings thereof.""' 6 Since the term "unjustifiable" is given no definition,
the undertaking seems to have been purely academic. Most of the later pro-
posals regarding foreign investment provide for complete freedom of transfer
of the earnings and interest on foreign investment as well as of the original
capital invested. The I.C.C. Code of Fair Treatment provides that capital-
importing states should allow freedom of transfer of current payments arising
out of the aliens' investments, including interest, dividends, and profits.
Similar freedom is to be allowed with respect to payments of principal and
other transfers of invested capital as well as all other payments "necessary for
the upkeep and renewal of assets" in capital-receiving states." 7 Freedom of
transfer is also accorded to all payments arising out of public loans or loans
guaranteed by public authority."' No restrictions or limitations on the
investors' freedom of transfer are recognized except those which "may be
authorized under the agreement of the International Monetary Fund.""'
The relevant provisions of the 1957 Draft Convention for the Mutual
Protection of Private Property Rights were less elaborate but similarly far-
reaching. It was provided that "the transfer of capital, returns on capital
investments, and compensation payments granted for expropriation . . .
are guaranteed in every case."' 2 ° This general statement was in no way
qualified and no possible exceptions were mentioned. The matter is not
touched upon in the latest draft of this convention, except perhaps, to
the extent that it may be included in the general provision on "fair and
equitable treatment" of the property of foreign nationals.'2 ' On the other
hand, the draft convention which was recently submitted by the Swiss
government to the O.E.E.C. provides in detail for the free transfer to the
foreign investor's country of residence of all earnings, amortization payments,
and incidental expenses of the enterprise as well as of any sum arising
out of the total or partial realization of such investment.
A similar but somewhat qualified rule is found in the report of the
European League for Economic Co-operation. It is stated there that
18 Bogota Agreement, art. 22(4). 1171.C.C. Code, art. 9.
11SIbid., art. 10. 119Ibid., art. 9(1).
1201957 Draft Convention, art. iv(5); and compare art. rv(3) (e).
12lCf. 1959 Draft Convention, art. i. Freedom of transfer is stipulated only in the
case of compensation for expropriated property; cf. infra fn. 142.
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"freedom of transfer in a stipulated currency would always be assured"
for the earnings of foreign investments, the salary of foreign personnel, and
"the normal redemptions of capital or of loans."' 22 The addition of the
word "normal" should be considered as limiting the right of foreign
investors to transfer abroad the original capital invested.
The report of the Economic Committee of the Council of Europe Con-
sultative Assembly admits expressly the possibility of "reasonable limita-
tions" on the repatriation of capital, while providing for the free transfer
of earnings and interest under normal conditions; under "exceptional con-
ditions" limitations might be allowed even as to current payments. 123 The
views of the British all-party commission's report on a world investment con-
vention are similar in their general effect, though they make no distinction
between capital and earnings. Free transfer abroad is to be provided for,
"subject to the possibility of exchange control on reasonable balance-of-
payments grounds," and to any agreement with the capital-importing
country's government with regard to "the rate of withdrawal of capital or
limitations of dividends."' 2 4
Particular emphasis is generally laid on the problems arising out of
measures of expropriation affecting foreign investments. An exception in this
respect is the I.T.O. Charter whose provisions on the matter were vague
and of limited effect. Each state member undertook to take no "unreasonable
or unjustifiable action ... injurious to the rights or interests of nationals of
other Members in the enterprise, skills, capital, arts or technology which
they have supplied."' 25 No other related provision is to be found, except for
a general commitment of the member states "to provide . . . adequate
security for existing and future investments,"' 2 6 subject to the charter's
provisions on the rights of capital-importing states.' 27
The Bogota Economic Agreement was more explicit. Not only did it
state in strong and clear terms the rule of national treatment in matters of
expropriation, in accordance with the constitutional and legislative rules
in effect in each state, but it also adopted certain absolute standards by
stating the need for "fair compensation in a prompt, adequate and effective
manner."'128 However, no less than eight out of a total of twenty-one signa-
tory states attached express reservations to the agreement's provision
on expropriation.
Some of the proposed codes provide strict conditions for the exercise of
the state's power of expropriation with regard to foreign investment. Accord-
ing to the I.C.C. Code of Fair Treatment, expropriations of alien property
are to be effected in accordance with certain "principles." The purpose and
conditions of any expropriation has to be stated explicitly in the relevant
122E.L.E.C., op. cit. supra fn. 88, at p. 19.
12 3 Consultative Assembly Document 1027, supra fn. 47, at pp. 17-18.
12 4 Parliamentary Group for World Government, op. cit. supra fn. 102, at p. 13.1 2 5Havana Charter, art. 11(1) (b). 126Ibid., art. 12(2) (a) (i).
12 7 See supra fn. 22. 12 8Bogota Agreement, art. 25.
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national legislation 29 and the appropriate legal procedures must be fol-
lowed.3 0 The compensation to be paid to the alien should be determined
prior to the expropriation and should be paid in cash or in "readily market-
able securities," freely transferable to the alien's currency.' 3 1 It is also
provided that compensation should be "fair . .. according to international
law.'1
3 2
Most of the other proposals lay greater stress on the form and measure
of compensation. Indeed, some of them raise only the question of compensa-
tion. This is true, for instance, of the Swiss proposal to the O.E.E.C. which
provides for the payment of adequate compensation, to be assessed prior to
the taking and to be freely transferable outside the expropriating state. The
European League's study also provides for the award of "just compensa-
tion" which "must cover the principal, appreciation and outstanding divi-
dends and interest. It must be made payable in a transferable currency,
with a gold clause, and be remitted to the investor within a fixed peoriod."' 3 3
The Council of Europe's report explicitly recognizes that it would be vain
to demand guarantees against "dispossession." The proposed convention
would stipulate that any expropriation to be effected would follow the
legal procedure provided for in the expropriating state and that fair com-
pensation would be forthcoming.' The British parliamentary group's
study, as well, completely ignores the matter of conditions and concentrates
on the need for fair compensation. This study is the only one to admit
that, while compensation would normally be "adequate, effective and
prompt," the expropriating country's capacity to pay should also be taken
into account.' 35
The 1957 Draft Convention of the German Society to Advance the Pro-
tection of Foreign Investments dealt in great detail with the problem of
expropriation. The convention made, in this connection, a distinction be-
tween foreign investors and other categories of alien property owners. The
property of foreign investors was not to be expropriated for at least thirty
years after investment. 36 A sole exception was allowed in the situation of a
national emergency. It was further stated, however, that expropriation is
permissible only when such an emergency cannot be met through temporary
restrictive measures, and that nationalization cannot by itself be considered
as constituting a national emergency. The property of other aliens could be
expropriated only when the "predominance of public interests demands such
action."' 37 The modalities of the compensation to be paid were dealt with in
some detail. The alien would be granted "substitution and/or compensation
1291.C.C. Code, art. 11(b). 13OIbid., art. 11(a).
1311bid., art. 11(c) and (d). 1321bid., art. 11(a).
133 E.L.E.C., op. cit. supra fn. 88, at p. 19.
134 Consultative Assembly Document 1027, supra fn. 47, at p. 18.
135Parliamentary Group for World Government, op. cit. supra fn. 102, at pp. 13-14.
1361957 Draft Convention, art. vr(1).
137Ibid., art. vi(2). According to the comments to the convention, "the words used ...
are designed to stress the exceptional character of expropriation." Ibid., pp. 54-5.
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equivalent to the value of the expropriated property," at his own choice.' 8
The amount and form of compensation would be determined prior to the
taking and final payment should be made "as soon as practicable." 8 9 Such
payment should be in cash or in "bonds listed on the Stock Exchange ...
secured against loss of substance and [carrying] commensurate interest,
amortization and guarantees."1 40
The draft convention prepared under the chairmanship of Lord Shawcross
formulated in a somewhat different manner the conditions for the legality
of expropriations. Measures depriving aliens of their property had to be
taken only for the public benefit, under due process of law, without dis-
crimination and with no violation of any "specific engagement" toward the
alien. No taking would be lawful if it were not accompanied by "just and
effective" compensation, representing the full value of the expropriated
property and paid in transferable form and without undue delay. Provision
for the determination and payment of such compensation would have to be
made at or prior to the time of taking. 4'
The 1959 Draft Convention, which combines the two earlier proposals,
follows, in the matter of expropriation, the Shawcross draft. One of the
conditions for the lawfulness of expropriation, namely, the requirement of
public interest, has been dropped, but the other conditions, as well as the
provisions on compensation, remain in substance the same as in the Shaw-
cross draft.'4 2 Like that draft, too, the 1959 Draft Convention refers ex-
plicitly to indirect as well as direct measures of expropriation. The former
would presumably include any regulatory government action which affects
foreign investors but falls short of an outright taking.143
The real importance of any legal document depends in great part on the
manner in which it is to be applied and the quality of the procedure which
is to be followed whenever any dispute as to the facts or as to the meaning
of its provisions arises. In recognition of this fact, all proposals for an invest-
ment code include provisions on procedures for the settlement of related
disputes.
The I.T.O. Charter and the Bogota Economic Agreement are partial
exceptions to this general statement. Neither of them contained special
provisions on the judicial settlement of investment disputes. Both of them
stressed the role of diplomatic rather than strictly judicial methods. The
Bogota Agreement, however, in addition to a provision on consultation
between governments and possible submission of disputes to the Council of
13Slbid., art. vin(1). Compensation is also to be granted in the case of restrictions on
alien property; cf. ibid., art. vii(2).139Ibid., art. vii(3).
14Olbid.
141Cf. Brandon, supra fn. 111, at p. 13.
1421959 Draft Convention, art. m. Cf. the cogent criticism of these provisions by
Metzger, supra fn. 73, at pp. 139-43; and Schwarzenberger, supra fn. 78, at pp. 156-60.14 30n the virtual impossibility of defining with precision the meaning of "indirect"
expropriation, see Metzger, supra fn. 73, at p. 157.
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the Organization of American States,'44 also referred to the "Inter-American
Peace System," established by the American Treaty of Pacific Settlement
("Act of Bogota") of April 30, 1948. This instrument provided in great
detail for procedures of consultation, arbitration, and recourse to the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
Some of the other proposals go so far as to suggest the creation of a special
judicial body, which would have jurisdiction to deal with any dispute arising
in connection with foreign investments. 4 ' As early as 1939, the League of
Nations Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts suggested
the creation of an international loan tribunal to deal with disputes between
states and bondholders.'4 6 In 1949, the I.C.C. Code of Fair Treatment
provided for the creation of an international court of arbitration to which
any differences which might arise between the states party to the proposed
code and which were not settled "within a short and reasonable period by
direct negotiation or by any other form of conciliation" were to be re-
ferred.' 47 The determination of the details of the working and composition
of this court were left to the negotiating governments. 4 It was not made
clear whether the court would be a permanent judicial body, similar to the
International Court of Justice, or would in fact constitute but a blueprint
for a series of ad hoc tribunals, on the model of the Hague Court of
Arbitration.
Some of the arguments for the creation of a special judicial body are
stated in the report of the British Parliamentary Group for World Govern-
ment."'49 The report admits that it would be simpler to refer all related
disputes to one of the already existing bodies, such as the International
Court of Justice. It points out, however, that in such a case and in view of
the statutes of these bodies, no individual investor would be allowed to bring
his case before the court. This result the report considers inadvisable in so
far as investment disputes are concerned. The creation of a new judicial
body is therefore proposed, which would specialize in the problems of
international investment. Its permanent seat would be in one of the under-
developed countries and it might even hold sessions in several countries,
somewhat in the manner of the British High Court on circuit.
The majority of the investment codes do not seem to favour the creation
of a special international tribunal. The evolution of the proposals of the
German Society to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investments provides
an interesting illustration of a change of opinion on this point. The 1957
144 Bogota Agreement, art. 38.
14 5For a survey of suggestions and attempts, see L. Sohn, "Proposals for the Establish-
ment of a System of International Tribunals" in M. Domke (ed.), International Trade
Arbitration (New York, 1958) p. 63. Individual scholars have also suggested the creation
of such courts; cf., for example, E. D. Re, "Nationalization and the Investment of Capital
Abroad" (1953), 42 Georgetown Law Journal 44, 56-8; K. S. Carlston, Law and
Structures of Social Action (New York, 1956), pp. 168-7 1.
146 League of Nations, Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts,
Report (1939). 1471.C.C. Code, art. 13.
148Ibid., art. 14. 149 Supra fn. 102, at pp. 18-19.
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Draft Convention provided for the creation of an international court to deal
with the legal disputes arising over the application of the convention.15 ° The
court was to be a permanent one, composed of members appointed for a
specified period of time by the states party to the convention. Its competence
would not depend on the previous exhaustion of local remedies. The court
was to determine the unlawful character of measures in contravention of
the convention and could order the imposition of a number of sanctions.'51
The convention also provided for the creation of arbitration committees to
decide problems of compensation or substitution arising under the terms of
the convention.' 52 These committees would be special ad hoc bodies com-
petent to deal with the economic matters arising in connection with expro-
priations and other measures. Lack of prompt compliance with their
decisions would constitute an unlawful act against which the international
court might apply the sanctions at its disposal1.5 3
The Shawcross draft's provisions on the settlement of disputes were rather
inadequate. Any disputes not settled by diplomatic means were to be sub-
mitted to the International Court of Justice.' 54 The 1959 Draft Convention
went further than that but stopped short of the 1957 Draft's proposals. In
an annex to the convention, a detailed procedure is set out for the formation
of special arbitration tribunals to deal with each particular dispute. 5' If the
parties to a dispute do not agree to submit it to arbitration, the dispute may
be brought to the International Court of Justice.
The proposals of the European League for Economic Co-operation follow
roughly similar lines.'56 The creation of a special permanent tribunal is
expressly rejected, on the grounds that it would deprive the proceedings of
the necessary flexibility. It is then proposed that a list of arbitrators be drawn
up composed of experts in financial and economic as well as legal matters.
Alternatively, the arbitrators could be named in advance in each investment
contract to be concluded between a foreign investor and the host country's
government.
It is to be noted that most of the recent proposals provide for the possibility
of recourse of private parties to the court or the arbitration tribunal to be
created.' 57 In one case, this consideration is treated as the determining
factor in the choice between a special tribunal and the existing ones.'5 In
other cases, the necessity for such recourse is stressed, 59 or it is taken as
1501957 Draft Convention, art. x( 1); and cf. the comments to it, ibid., pp. 59-61.
151Ibid., art. xI; and cf. infra p. 98.
1521bid., art. x(2), and comments to it at pp. 59-61.
153Cf. infra pp. 98.
154 Cf. Brandon, supra fn. 111, at pp. 13-14.
1551959 Draft Convention, art. vii and Annex.
156E.L.E.C., op. cit. supra fn. 88, at pp. 25-7.
15 7 Such provision is not to be found in the I.T.O. Charter, the Bogota Economic
Agreement, the I.C.C. Code of Fair Treatment, and the draft convention proposed to the
O.E.E.C. by the Swiss government.
15s8Cf. supra p. 96 and fn. 149.
159 Cf. Council of Europe Consultative Assembly Document 1027, supra fn. 47, at p. 19.
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granted.' 60 This need was emphasized in the 1957 Draft Convention which
provided that private individuals as well as states would be entitled to the
rights under it."6 In the accompanying commentary, it was stated, somewhat
cryptically, that "this individualization of rights under the Convention will
do much to strengthen private responsibility."' 62 It would also eliminate the
individual's dependence upon the espousal of his claim by the state of his
nationality. These provisions were included in a significantly modified form
in the 1959 Draft Convention on Investments Abroad.'63 The right of indi-
viduals to have recourse to the arbitral tribunals to be instituted under the
convention is now made contingent upon an "optional clause." Any state
party to the convention may file a declaration to the effect that it accepts
the tribunal's jurisdiction "in respect of claims by nationals of one or more
parties." 164
Closely related to the topic of settlement of disputes is the question of
sanctions which may be imposed against a state violating the investment code
and refusing to abide by an arbitral award. Some of the proposals place
great emphasis on this point. The relevant provisions of the European
League for Economic Co-operation study have already been noted.165
Similar provisions were included in the 1957 Draft Convention for the
Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries. Its
article xi provided for the procedure to be followed and the measures to be
taken against a state acting in violation of its obligations under the con-
vention. Once the unlawfulness of the state measures involved was estab-
lished by a court decision, the state at fault would be asked to revoke them
within a fixed period of time. If it failed to comply, its conduct would be
publicly condemned by the court. The other states party to the convention
would refuse to recognize within their territories the measures in question
and would make available, for the satisfaction of the judgment, any property
of the state at fault which they might have in their power. 66 A list of possible
additional economic sanctions is provided in an appendix. Their application
and their nature and extent would depend on the character and the degree
of unlawfulness of the state measures involved. Such sanctions would include
refusal of public or private loans to the state at fault, denial of investment
guarantees to foreign investors operating in it, and recommendations to
private or public banks in the capital-exporting states to refuse credits to
enterprises intending to invest in the state at fault. Any inter-governmental
agreements which would not conform to the convention's standard, agree-
16OCf. E.L.E.C., op. cit. supra fn. 88, at pp. 20, 26.
1611957 Draft Convention, art ix, cf. supra p. 86. 162Ibid., at p. 59.
1631959 Draft Convention, art. vii(2). The Shawcross draft did not provide for the
direct access of private parties to international judicial proceedings; cf. Brandon, supra fn.
111, at pp. 13-14.
16 4 Cf. the authors' comments, 9 Journal of Public Law 119, 121, and Professor
Schwarzenberger's critical observations, supra fn. 78, at pp. 162-3.
165Supra, pp. 89-90.
1661957 Draft Convention, art. xi(2) and (4). The commentary to the convention,
ibid. p. 64, made clear that private property of the nationals of the state at fault and
property enjoying diplomatic immunity would be excluded from such measures.
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ments for global compensation, for example, would be declared ineffec-
tive.16 7 There are no such elaborate provisions in the 1959 Draft Convention
on Investment Abroad. It contains only a general clause to the effect that
when a state fails to comply with an award against it, the other states party
to the convention "shall be entitled, individually or collectively, to take such
measures as are strictly required to give effect to that judgment or award."'' .8
No specific provisions on sanctions are included in the other proposed
codes. In some of them the advisability of such provisions is expressly denied.
Thus, the report of the British Parliamentary Group for World Government
states that "no sanctions, in any normal sense of the word, are likely to be
generally acceptable at the present time. .. ""' The only possible measure
would be the publication of the arbritration tribunal's award and the conse-
quent exposure of the states at fault before world public opinion. In discuss-
ing the question of sanctions, the Council of Europe report also reaches the
conclusion that it is not possible to determine them beforehand with any
precision. The states party to the proposed convention would consult in each
particular instance and decide on the appropriate steps which they would
take.' 70 The only general measures which are provided for are the refusal
of all states members to recognize any acts contrary to the purposes of the
convention and the obligation of the party at fault to pay full compensation. 71
III
The problems relating to the formulation and adoption of an international
investment code have received lately a good deal of attention. Here, it is only
possible to indicate the outlines of the related arguments. The proponents of
an investment code point out that it is the simplest as well as the most
effective means to assure the protection of private foreign investment. They
generally admit the difficulties involved in assuring the compliance of states
with the code's provisions, but they tend to assume that the existence of the
code, in the form of a multilateral convention, will in most cases be sufficient
to prevent any breach of its provisions. In some proposals, an effort has been
made to provide sanctions for non-compliance, through direct or indirect
action of the states concerned. The effectiveness of such sanctions depends
on the capital-importing countries' continuing need for foreign capital and
on the possibility of concerted action on the part of capital-exporting states.
The idea of an investment code is partly founded on the assumption that
the commercial and financial interests of capital-exporting and capital-
importing countries are largely identical. 72 Though an ultimate identity of
interests, in the long run, may perhaps be presumed, it is certainly not true
167Ibid., art. xx(7). 1681959 Draft Convention, art. vm.
16 9Supra fn. 102, at p. 19.
170 Consultative Assembly Document 1027, supra fn. 47, at p. 19.
171Ibid. at p. 18.
172 For a critique of this assumption, see A. S. Miller, "Protection of Private Foreign
Investment by Multilateral Convention" (1959), 53 American Journal of International
Law 371, 375-6.
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that, with regard to the various countries' immediate interests, no divergen-
cies exist. Such divergencies are manifested not only in the commercial
policies of developed and underdeveloped countries 7 but also in their
conception of international relations and even of certain issues in inter-
national law. Matters regarding the taking of private property owned by
aliens are well-known illustrations of such issues. It is difficult to see how the
underdeveloped countries can be induced to accept the capital-exporting
countries' views with respect to these questions. Their undeniable need for
capital is unlikely to constitute by itself sufficient inducement, particularly
when the present world political situation is taken into account. Under-
developed countries depend only in part on private direct foreign investment
and the lack of an investment code does not necessarily affect the existing
other sources of capital, such as capital provided by governments or inter-
national financial agencies. The exercise of direct or indirect pressure on the
part of capital-exporting states, by means, for instance, of the refusal to give
public loans or grants, or the imposition of restrictions on export credits,
seems improbable, under present conditions. Capital-exporting countries
are not prepared today to jeopardize the political allegiance of underde-
veloped countries in order to achieve their reluctant adhesion to a charter of
doubtful effectiveness.
174
Apart from considerations of this order, the general adoption of an effec-
tive investment code appears unlikely for several reasons. A code's provisions,
if they are to afford some protection to foreign investors, would have to limit
to some extent the sovereignty of all states participating in it. It seems certain
that many states, including several capital-exporting ones, would not be
prepared to undertake far-reaching commitments in this connection. 175 Their
reluctance should in part be attributed to a desire not to commit themselves
with regard to matters of domestic economic policy. In some cases, a state's
federal system of government may make difficult the acceptance of such
commitments. More generally, capital-exporting states usually prefer to
retain a high degree of freedom of movement in their domestic and inter-
national policies. They tend, therefore, to favour specific commitments of
limited extent, and not general and extensive undertakings. There is, then,
no real paradox in the capital-importing states' willingness to grant to
individual foreign investors certain rights or privileges which they refuse
to give to investors as a whole.
173 Cf., for example, G. Myrdal, An International Economy (New York, 1956), pp. 222
et seq.
174 Such considerations are operative with particular regard to the proposals involving
the creation of a coalition of capital-exporting states, attempting to impose a charter of
treatment of foreign investors on the capital-importing states. Cf. supra pp. 87, 88. It is
interesting to note hat the only state where the agitation for an international investment
code haq -- ,- .v some official support is the Federal Republic of Germany, whose inter-
national political responsibilities at this moment can hardly be compared to those of the
United States or the United Kingdom.
175 0n the probable attitude of the United States and some other economically de-
veloped states in this connection, see S. J. Rubin, Private Foreign Investment (Baltimore,
1956), pp. 20, 81; J. G. Fulton, address in (1958) 52 American Society of International
Law Proceedings 200, 204; Metzger, supra fn. 73, at pp. 138, 145.
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Certain additional considerations obtain in the particular case of capital-
importing countries. First, capital-exporting states cannot give any assurance
that substantial amounts of new foreign private capital will be invested,
since their governments have a limited degree of control over the disposition
of the funds of private citizens. Even if legal obstacles are removed, economic
reasons may well prevent foreign investments in some or all underdeveloped
countries. Thus, capital-importing states would have to accept certain
definite obligations without any corresponding undertakings on the part of
the capital-exporting states.1 76 It may be argued at this point that, if no
investment is made, the capital-importing countries' obligations would re-
main without object and, therefore, ineffective. There exists, however, a
variety of possible levels and forms of investment. A capital-importing
country would adhere to an investment code only in order to assure itself a
high level of foreign investment. It would object to having to apply its
obligations under the code to a limited number of foreign investors perhaps
in fields of little importance to its economic development.
Most of the proposed draft codes are one-sided in another way, too. They
provide for the protection of the investors' interests without attempting to
safeguard the host state's interests. There is no convincing justification for
this bias. It is sometimes said that nowadays it is the foreign investor rather
than the host state that is in need of protection. 1' 77 The statement's validity
is doubtful, but, even assuming its truth, it does not follow that provisions
regarding the investors' duties toward the host state as well as the duties of
capital-exporting states toward the capital-importing countries should not be
included in a comprehensive investment code. If such duties are well deter-
mined and there is no possible dispute about them their inclusion in the code
certainly would do no harm. If, on the other hand, they are not well settled,
they evidently should be examined and better determined in the interests of
both the investors and the capital-importing states. Though ultimately
intended to provide assurance to foreign investors, an investment code should
not be a one-sided instrument. It should attempt to regulate comprehensively
the whole relationship between host state and foreign investors.178 Other-
wise, such a code might be construed as limiting the former's powers without
restricting the latter's freedom of action.
Assuming that, in spite of the difficulties we have mentioned, the formula-
tion and adoption of an investment code might still be possible, it is highly
improbable, in view of present-day conditions, that such a code, if adopted,
176 See contra Shawcross, supra fn. 78, at p. 21, who argues "that the quid pro quo for
the borrowing states' undertakings is in fact, in the English vernacular, the provision of
the 'quids', that the capital importing countries, in return for agreeing to abide by the
generally recognized procedure of International Law, will receive more -;vate investment
... than would otherwise be the case." But how certain is that effect?
177Cf., for example, I.C.C. Code, Introductory Report, par. 19; J. N. Hyde, Book
Review (1957), 66 Yale Law Journal 813, 816.
178 For a powerful statement in support of this view, see A. Larson. "Recipients' Rights
under an International Investment Code" (1960), 9 Journal of Public Law 172. Note
that some of the proposed codes discussed supra have attempted to do this, with varying
degrees of success. And see also Shawcross, supra fn. 78, at p. 21.
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would be effective to any significant extent. The multilateral convention is
difficult to administer when dealing with matters where particular situations
and exceptional cases are of importance. An international investment con-
vention among many states would have to be couched in general terms,
because many varieties of political and economic structures and innumerable
kinds of investment would be affected by it. Qualifications and exceptions
would have to be added, each one of them quite necessary to the state or
states immediately concerned. The end result is bound to be a cumbersome
and vague instrument open to a variety of interpretations. The precedents of
the Havana Charter and the Bogota Economic Agreement are instructive in
this connection. And it should be noted that the political power of under-
developed countries as a whole has greatly increased since the first postwar
years, while the capital-exporting countries are in no way in a stronger
position now than they were then.
As long as there exists a divergence between the interests of capital-
exporting and capital-importing states, the positive contribution of an invest-
ment code is bound to be very limited. But its negative impact may be far
more serious. The preliminary negotiations and discussions and the inter-
national conference that would presumably follow would tend to intensify
rather than reduce the existing differences of opinion and might lead to the
adoption of extreme and rigid positions.1"9 Capital-importing countries
might then be unwilling to grant exemptions or privileges to individual
foreign investors, for they would fear that such action might be used as an
argument against their official position.
An alternative course might perhaps still be open. It has been suggested
recently 80 that the staff of one of the international financial agencies dealing
with international investment could draft a set of principles laying down the
obligations as well as the rights of foreign investors in underdeveloped
countries. Compliance with this charter would be required of all firms and
governments seeking the institution's aid. In this manner, the disadvantages
of negotiations between government representatives might be in part
eliminated. The difficulties, however, which are inherent in the formulation
of a widely acceptable set of principles would still persist. The advantage of
this scheme lies in its institutional setting, which makes possible the applica-
tion of such principles in a flexible and sophisticated manner and provides
a number of ways for the settlement of disputes. From this standpoint, the
proposal presents certain similarities with some other suggestions which
stress the institutions charged with applying the charter rather than the
charter itself.'
'
7 9Cf., in agreement, Fulton, supra fn. 175, at p. 202; R. N. Gardner, "International
Measures for the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment" (1959), 53 American
Society International Law Proceedings 255, 259-62; Metzger, supra fn. 73, at pp. 145-6.1 80 See Gardner, supra fn. 179, pp. 265-6; R. N. Gardner, "New Directions in U.S.
Foreign Economic Policy," 1959 Headline Series no. 133, at p. 42.
l8lcf., for example, the proposals of the Parliamentary Group for World Government,
supra p. 90, and Carlston, op. cit. supra fn. 145, at pp. 168-71.
